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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF  
AMICI CURIAE 
 
 The identity and interest of Amici are described in the Motion for 
Leave to File that accompanies this brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 In State v. Bassett, this Court advanced article I, section 14 
jurisprudence by adopting a categorical bar analysis to determine that this 
state’s robust protection against cruel punishment led to but one 
conclusion: juvenile life without parole is never constitutional. 198 Wn. 
App. 714, 394 P.3d 430 (2017), review granted, 189 Wn.2d 1008 (2017). 
Because the Washington Supreme Court requires Washington courts to 
treat de facto juvenile life without parole sentences as they do actual life 
without parole sentences, State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 438–39, 387 
P.3d 650 (2017), it follows both naturally and necessarily that de facto life 
without parole is also categorically barred.  
Even if this Court declines to apply the categorical bar analysis to 
de facto life without parole, article I, section 14 is more protective than the 
Eighth Amendment in the juvenile sentencing context and mandates 
concurrent sentencing in Mr. Leo’s case. Under the Eighth Amendment, 
life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender is 
constitutional only in the “rarest” of cases. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 
  2 
 
 
U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). Thus, if the 
heightened protection of article I, section 14 is to have continuing vitality, 
article I, section 14 must never permit mandatory consecutive minimum 
sentences that result in imposition of an effective life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii). 
Employing the Gunwall1 factors as interpretive tools to determine the 
specific nature of the heightened protection in this juvenile sentencing 
context reaffirms that de facto juvenile life without parole sentences—
whether through mandatory consecutive minimum sentences or 
otherwise—violate article I, section 14.  
Because this Court must adopt a reading of the statute that is 
constitutional, amici urge this Court to affirm Mr. Leo’s sentence by 
applying Bassett’s categorical bar on juvenile life without parole under 
RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) to de facto life without parole sentences under 
the same statute. Alternatively, amici urge this Court to recognize that the 
heightened protection of article I, section 14 forecloses any reading of the 
statute that would permit mandatory consecutive minimum sentencing 
resulting in an effective life sentence for a juvenile.2 
                                                 
 
1 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 
2 In addition to violating article I, section 14, such a reading of the statute would 
create two classifications of juvenile offenders that would fail rational basis review under 
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I. THIS COURT’S OPINION IN STATE V. BASSETT, WHICH 
CATEGORICALLY BARRED JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE, APPLIES TO BOTH ACTUAL AND DE FACTO 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AND THUS REQUIRES 
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE.  
 
In Bassett, this Court held that “under a categorical bar analysis, 
the statutory Miller-fix provision [RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii)] that allows 
16- to 18-year old offenders convicted of aggravated first degree murder 
to be sentenced to life without parole or early release violates article I, 
section 14 of the state constitution.”3, 4 198 Wn. App. at 716. Thus, Mr. 
Bassett’s resentencing to three life without parole sentences (for three 
counts of aggravated first-degree murder) pursuant to RCW 
10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) was unconstitutional. Id. Nevertheless, the State’s 
                                                 
 
an equal protection challenge. In re Knapp, 102 Wn.2d 466, 687 P.2d 1145 (1984) 
(holding that a violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the federal and 
state constitutions requires dissimilar treatment of persons similarly situated with respect 
to the legitimate purposes of the law). Given that Ramos holds that Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 138 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), applies with equal force to both 
literal and de facto life without parole sentence, Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438–39, there 
would be no legitimate purpose in depriving juvenile offenders who have committed 
multiple counts of aggravated murder of the opportunity for release. See Ramos, 187 
Wn.2d at 439.   
3 The categorical bar analysis determines whether a certain form of punishment 
against a certain class of people is barred based on 1) the consensus against a punishment 
and 2) the independent judgement of the court. See Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 729–30; see 
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–17, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002). 
In Bassett, Washington adopted a distilled version of the Atkins standard. 198 Wn. App. 
at 732–38. 
4 The portion of RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) in question states: “Any person 
convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder for an offense committed when 
the person is at least sixteen years old but less than eighteen years old shall be sentenced 
to a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of total confinement of no 
less than twenty-five years.” 
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interpretation of RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) would subject juvenile 
offenders who commit multiple counts of aggravated murder, like Mr. 
Leo, to de facto life without parole through mandatory consecutive 
minimum sentences. Such a reading of the statute would result, at a 
minimum, in a 125-year sentence for Mr. Leo—a result that is both 
illogical and unconstitutional.  
The State’s reading of the statute ignores Ramos, in which our 
Supreme Court counseled that “Miller’s reasoning clearly shows that it 
applies to any juvenile homicide offender who might be sentenced to die 
in prison without a meaningful opportunity to gain early release based on 
demonstrated rehabilitation.” 187 Wn.2d at 438. The Ramos court 
specifically stated that Miller applies with equal force to both multiple 
homicides and single homicides, id., and rejected the artificial distinction 
between actual and de facto life without parole: “[W]e also reject the 
notion that Miller applies only to literal, not de facto, life-without-parole 
sentences. . . . Whether that sentence is for a single crime or an aggregated 
sentence for multiple crimes, we cannot ignore that the practical result is 
the same.” Id. at 438–39. 
Failure to apply Bassett’s categorical bar to foreclose mandatory 
consecutive minimum sentences under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) would 
ignore precisely what the Ramos court recognized: that the practical result 
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of a de facto life without parole sentence is a sentence of death in prison.5 
Amici urge this Court to reject the State’s reading of the statute as 
unconstitutional and explicitly hold that its decision in Bassett 
encompasses de facto life without parole.  
Further, as amici explain below, even if this Court does not 
conclude that Bassett’s categorical bar encompasses de facto life without 
parole sentences, it should nevertheless conclude that RCW 
10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) would violate article I, section 14 to the extent it could 
be read to require mandatory consecutive minimum sentences. See also 
Br. of Resp’t. at 19–21 (arguing that such a reading of the statute would 
violate article I, section 14 as well as the Eighth Amendment). 
II. ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 IS MORE PROTECTIVE THAN 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN A VARIETY OF 
CONTEXTS, AND THE GUNWALL FACTORS ASSIST IN 
ARTICULATING THE NATURE OF THIS HEIGHTENED 
PROTECTION IN THE JUVENILE SENTENCING 
CONTEXT. 
 
Washington courts routinely hold that article I, section 14 is more 
protective than its federal counterpart, and those few cases that determine 
article I, section 14 to be coextensive with the Eighth Amendment are 
                                                 
 
5 While there is no consensus on exactly what term of years amounts to a de 
facto life without parole sentence as a general proposition, it is beyond dispute that the 
sentence the State advocates—five consecutive 25-year terms for a total of 125 years—
sentences Mr. Leo to die in prison.   
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products of the narrow contexts in which the claims arose. Thus, when 
article I, section 14 is invoked in a new context, the material inquiry is not 
whether the provision affords broader protection than the Eighth 
Amendment, but how the provision affords broader protection in this new 
context. See Blomstrom v. Tripp, __Wn.2d__, 402 P.3d 831, 842–43 
(2017) (noting that article I, section 7 provides more robust protection than 
the Fourth Amendment and then utilizing the Gunwall factors to establish 
the nature of the heightened protection in the new context of privacy rights 
of pretrial detainees). 
A. Washington Courts Have Determined that Article I, Section  
14 Is More Protective than the Eighth Amendment in a  
Variety of Contexts. 
 
In the watershed case of State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 392–93, 617 
P.2d 720 (1980), our Supreme Court held that article I, section 14 is more 
protective than the Eighth Amendment.6 Since Fain, Washington courts 
have continued to so hold in a variety of sentencing contexts. For the 
juvenile sentencing context, see Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 723. For 
                                                 
 
6 The Fain court noted that it previously held a variety of Washington 
constitutional provisions to be more protective than their federal counterparts. 94 Wn.2d 
at 392. Then, for the first time, the court used a four-factor proportionality analysis to 
determine whether the defendant’s sentence violated article I, section 14, even though the 
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 397–401. However, for the reasons 
discussed in note 8, proportionality analysis is ill-suited to assessing the constitutionality 
of juvenile sentences.  
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persistent offender cases, see State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 
329 P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 674, 921 P.2d 
473 (1996); State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712, 921 P.2d 495 (1996); 
State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 772, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). For death 
penalty cases, see State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 506, 14 P.3d 713 
(2000); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 639, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). 
For consecutive sentences, see Wahleithner v. Thompson, 134 Wn. App. 
931, 936, 143 P.3d 321 (Div. I 2006). For cases indirectly supporting the 
conclusion that article I, section 14 provides greater protection than the 
Eighth Amendment, see In re Rupe, 115 Wn.2d 379, 396 n.5, 798 P.2d 
780 (1990) (in the death penalty context, noting article I, section 14’s 
greater protection); In re Johnston, 99 Wn.2d 466, 478, 663 P.2d 457 
(1983) (in a medical license denial case, citing Fain as an example of 
article I, section 14 providing broader protection than the Eighth 
Amendment); State v. Grenning, 142 Wn. App. 518, 545–46, 174 P.3d 
706 (Div. II 2008) (performing a Fain analysis in the consecutive and 
concurrent sentencing context to determine whether the sentence violated 
article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment); In re Haynes, 100 Wn. 
App. 366, 375–76, 996 P.2d 637 (Div. I 2000) (in the exceptional 
sentencing context, indirectly affirming the proposition by performing a 
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Fain analysis to determine whether the sentence violated both article I, 
section 14 and the Eighth Amendment).  
The second watershed moment in article I, section 14 
jurisprudence is the triad of Manussier, Rivers, and Thorne, which 
together crystallized Fain’s holding.7 Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 674; 
Rivers, 129 Wn.2d at 712; Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 772. These cases 
reinforced that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth 
Amendment and more specifically reinforced that the Fain proportionality 
analysis is the proper way to determine whether a particular sentence is 
                                                 
 
7 Immediately post-Fain, the Washington Court of Appeals inconsistently or 
improperly applied the Fain analysis, occasionally construing article I, section 14 as 
coextensive with the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 51 Wn. App. 42, 47–
48, 751 P.2d 1226 (1988) (equating proportionality analysis under article I, section 14 
with proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment); see also State v. Creekmore, 
55 Wn. App. 852, 870–72, 783 P.2d 1068 (1989) (citing Bowen, 51 Wn. App. at 47) 
(stating that article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment are given essentially 
identical treatment). However, the clarity of our Supreme Court’s holdings in Manussier, 
Rivers, and Thorne cast doubt upon the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Bowen and 
Creekmore.  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals since Bowen and Creekmore has articulated 
article I, section 14’s heightened protection and applied the Fain analysis. State v. Hart, 
188 Wn. App. 453, 461, 353 P.3d 253 (Div. III 2015); State v. Flores, 114 Wn. App. 218, 
223, 56 P.3d 622 (Div. I 2002); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. 370, 380, 20 P.3d 430 
(Div. II 2001); State v. Morin, 100 Wn. App. 25, 29, 995 P.2d 113 (Div. I 2000); State v. 
Ames, 89 Wn. App. 702, 709 n.8, 950 P.2d 514 (Div. I 1998). 
  9 
 
 
proportionate to the crime.8 Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 734 (citing Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)). 
After these three cases, Washington courts have overwhelmingly affirmed 
that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, 
whether in the persistent offender context or other contexts.9  
Although persistent offender cases are the most common context in 
which article I, section 14’s greater protection arises,10 its broader 
protections also extend to the death penalty and consecutive sentencing 
contexts. See, e.g., Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471 (death penalty); Wahleithner, 
134 Wn. App. 931 (consecutive sentences).  
                                                 
 
8 Amici discuss Fain and its progeny to highlight the development of article I, 
section 14 jurisprudence, although the proportionality test itself is not well-suited to 
analyzing whether Mr. Leo’s sentence is constitutional. Proportionality analysis considers 
the crime and the sentence, but does not take into account the characteristics of the 
offender. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 738; State v. Thompson, 194 Wn. App. 1031, 2016 
WL 3264369 at *5 (2016) (Bjorgen, J., dissenting) (unpublished) (“If, consistently 
with Witherspoon, article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, 
then it should be interpreted parallel to O'Dell to require consideration of an offender's 
youth during the years in which the scientific studies tell us the characteristics of youth 
may persist. Without this, article I, section 14 is diminished to the reach of Miller.”). 
9 See Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d at 887; Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 506; Bassett, 198 
Wn. App. at 723; Hart, 188 Wn. App. at 461; Grenning, 142 Wn. App. at 545–46; 
Wahleithner, 134 Wn. App. at 936; Flores, 114 Wn. App. at 223; Gimarelli, 105 Wn. 
App. at 380; Morin, 100 Wn. App. at 29; In re Haynes, 100 Wn. App. at 375–76; Ames, 
89 Wn. App. at 709 n.8. 
10 While Witherspoon might be read to suggest that article I, section 14 is more 
protective only in the persistent offender context, see 180 Wn.2d at 887 (“This court has 
held that the state constitutional provision is more protective than the Eighth Amendment 
in this context”), a survey of both persistent offender and non-persistent offender cases 
reveal that this is not the case, see pages 6–9, supra.  
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Rarely has article I, section 14 been held to be merely coextensive 
with the Eighth Amendment. In State v. Dodd, the court determined that 
article I, section 14 did not extend greater protection than the Eighth 
Amendment within the narrow context of whether a capital defendant can 
waive general appellate review. 120 Wn.2d 1, 21, 838 P.2d 86 (1992). 
Thus, the handful of cases citing Dodd for the general proposition that 
article I, section 14 does not provide greater protection than the Eighth 
Amendment are flawed.11 In addition, our Supreme Court decided 
Manussier, Rivers, and Thorne after Dodd. Rivers and Thorne ignore 
Dodd. See Rivers, 129 Wn.2d at 712–15; Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 772–76. 
Manussier explicitly holds Dodd as applicable only to its narrow context. 
Manussier; 129 Wn.2d at 674 n.89. When courts consider Dodd’s limited 
holding alongside post-Dodd death penalty cases that hold article I, 
section 14 to be more protective, see, e.g., Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, it is 
beyond dispute that Dodd and the few cases that rely on Dodd are outliers.  
                                                 
 
11 See State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 792, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (relying on 
Dodd’s statement that article I, section 14 does not necessarily extend greater protection 
to dismiss Yates’s argument that the death penalty statute is arbitrary, when Dodd 
examined only whether article I, section 14 extended greater protection for waiver of 
appeal); In re Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 731, 327 P.3d 660 (2014) (despite Dodd’s narrow 
context, similarly relying on Dodd’s claim that article I, section 14 is not necessarily 
more protective when dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that the death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional); see also State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 631–32, 888 P.2d 1105 
(1995) (relying on Dodd in determining article I, section 14 did not bar victim impact 
evidence in capital cases). 
  11 
 
 
B. A Gunwall Analysis Is No Longer Necessary to Determine 
Whether Article I, Section 14 Affords Greater Protection than 
the Eighth Amendment, but Instead Assists Courts and 
Litigants in Determining How Article I, Section 14 Is More 
Protective in a Given Context. 
 
Courts have consistently used a Gunwall analysis when first 
deciding whether a state constitutional provision provides greater 
protection than its federal counterpart.12 State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 
769 n.7, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). Once state constitutional jurisprudence has 
established that a particular constitutional provision is more protective, 
Gunwall becomes an interpretive device, used to define the nature of the 
heightened protection in each new context. See Tripp, 402 P.3d at 842 
(noting that state constitutional provisions provide protections which are 
“qualitatively different from, and in some cases broader” than their federal 
counterparts and that “this enhanced protection depends on the context in 
question,” and then performing a Gunwall analysis to determine the nature 
of the protection in a new context) (internal citations omitted)).  
                                                 
 
12 The State criticizes Mr. Leo for not performing a Gunwall analysis to support 
his position that RCW 10.95.030 requires concurrent sentences for multiple convictions 
of aggravated murder. Br. of Appellant at 26–31, State v. Leo, No. 49863-4-II. However, 
while a Gunwall analysis provides helpful standards on briefing, it does not otherwise 
limit the duty of the courts to interpret and apply the state constitution. City of 
Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 641–42, 211 P.3d 
406 (2009) (“A strict rule that courts will not consider state constitutional claims without 
a complete Gunwall analysis could return briefing into an antiquated writ system where 
parties may lose their constitutional rights by failing to incant correctly. Gunwall is better 
understood to prescribe appropriate arguments: if the parties provide argument on state 
constitutional provisions and citation, a court may consider the issue.”). 
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State v. White represents such a moment in the evolution of article 
I, section 7 jurisprudence. There, the court held that prior cases 
established, as a matter of state constitutional jurisprudence, that article I, 
section 7 differs from the Fourth Amendment. 135 Wn.2d at 769. The 
court traced the evolution of article I, section 7 and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence until it reached the conclusion that what would be 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment was no longer permissible under 
article I, section 7. Id. at 769–71. Then, with this general, heightened 
protection in mind, the court looked specifically at the context of 
inventory searches and held article I, section 7 to be more protective. Id. at 
770–72. 
Similarly, what would be permissible under the Eighth 
Amendment is no longer permissible under article I, section 14. The 
evolution of article I, section 14 jurisprudence establishes that it is 
consistently more protective than the Eighth Amendment. See supra II.A. 
Because the basis for article I, section 14’s greater protection is well-
established, Gunwall’s purpose of providing well-founded legal reasoning 
to establish a principled basis has already been achieved; a Gunwall 
analysis is therefore unnecessary to establish whether article I, section 14 
is more protective. Instead, this Court must now examine the nature of the 
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heightened article I, section 14 protection in the juvenile sentencing 
context.  
C. Both this Court and our Supreme Court Have Already 
Extended the Eighth Amendment’s Protection of Juveniles  
in a Manner Consistent with the Heightened Protection of 
Article I, Section 14.  
 
The fourth Gunwall factor, preexisting state law, includes 
consideration of how Washington has extended protection to juvenile 
defendants beyond what the Eighth Amendment requires, and the sixth 
Gunwall factor considers whether the matter is of particular state concern. 
Both factors support the conclusion that article I, section 14 affords 
heightened protection in the juvenile sentencing context.13 With respect to 
factor 6, there can be no dispute that our state’s juvenile justice system, 
along with the norms that system abides by, are matters of particular state 
interest or local concern. 
                                                 
 
13 Factors four and six are the most salient in determining how article I, section 
14 provides juveniles heightened protection. The other factors support the more general 
proposition that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment. 
Factor two, differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the Federal and State 
constitutions, supports a broader reading as it forbids all cruel punishment, rather than 
punishment that is both cruel and unusual. Dodd, 120 Wn.2d at 21 (for a discussion of 
why Dodd’s larger conclusion that article I, section 14 is limited to that case, see page 10, 
supra). Factor three, state constitutional and common law history, counsels in favor of 
broad protection for juvenile offenders as well because Washington has recognized the 
unconstitutionality of certain practices against certain categories of offenders: “[A]rticle 
I, Section 14 of the state constitution, like the Eighth Amendment, proscribes 
disproportionate sentencing in addition to certain modes of punishment.” Bassett, 198 
Wn. App. at 733 (quoting Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 676) (emphasis added in Bassett). 
Factor five, the difference in structure between the state and federal constitution, always 
supports broader protection. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 180, 867 P.2d 593 (1994).  
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Washington courts have answered the question of how article I, 
section 14 is more protective in the juvenile context because they have 
extended the reasoning of Miller beyond its holding to ensure heightened 
protection of juvenile offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–79 (recognizing 
that juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform, and therefore holding that mandatory life without parole for 
juveniles is unconstitutional because juveniles are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing). In Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, the Court determined Miller applied retroactively and held that 
juvenile life without parole is unconstitutional in all but the “rarest” of 
cases, reserved for those individuals “whose crimes reflect permanent 
incorrigibility.” 136 S. Ct. at 734. Under Miller and Montgomery, the 
opportunity for release will be afforded to those who “demonstrate the 
truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous 
crimes are less culpable and capable of change.” Id. at 736.   
Post-Miller and -Montgomery, the Washington Supreme Court has 
expanded and better defined the protection afforded to juveniles. In 
Ramos, the court logically extended Miller to apply to de facto life 
sentences because “[w]hether that sentence is for a single crime or an 
aggregated sentence for multiple crimes, we cannot ignore that the 
practical result is the same.” Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 439. The Ramos court 
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also explicitly acknowledged that Miller’s reasoning applies with equal 
force to multiple homicides as it does to single homicides: “[N]othing 
about Miller suggests its individualized sentencing requirement is limited 
to single homicides because ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish 
the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on 
juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.’” Id. at 438 
(citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465) (emphasis added in Ramos). 
In State v. O’Dell, the court further extended Miller when it 
allowed the youth of an adult offender to be considered as a justification 
for departures below the standard sentencing range, in recognition that the 
juvenile brain is not fully developed by the age of eighteen. 183 Wn.2d 
680, 688–98, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). In State v. Houston-Sconiers, the court 
expanded Miller even further when it declared that for courts to fully 
address the mitigating qualities of youth, courts need absolute discretion to 
depart from sentencing guidelines and any other mandatory sentencing 
enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court. 188 Wn.2d 1, 21–
26, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). 
 While neither Ramos, O’Dell, nor Houston-Sconiers was explicitly 
based on article I, section 14, our Supreme Court has demonstrated its 
commitment to expand Eighth Amendment jurisprudence beyond its 
formal holdings. Thus, even though the Washington Supreme Court has 
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not explicitly addressed how article I, section 14 is more protective in the 
juvenile context, it has fully embraced the precept that “children are 
constitutionally different” and has articulated rules that counteract the 
significant risks of applying adult sentencing procedures to juveniles.  
If the heightened protection of article I, section 14 is to mean 
anything, this Court should take the next step in ensuring that juvenile 
defendants are not sentenced to die in prison and hold that mandatory 
consecutive minimum sentences under 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) resulting in de 
facto life without parole would violate article I, section 14. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Amici urge this Court to explicitly hold that the categorical bar 
against juvenile life without parole announced in Bassett encompasses 
both actual and de facto life without parole sentences. Should this Court 
decline to so hold, amici urge the Court to hold that RCW 
10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) requires concurrent rather than consecutive minimum 
terms—the only reading of the statute consistent with the heightened 
protection of article I, section 14. For the foregoing reasons, amici 
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